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1 INTRODUCTION  
Internal erosion is a major cause of failures of water 
retaining structures. Around half of the failures are 
caused by internal erosion (piping) and half are 
caused by external erosion (overtopping); failures by 
sliding are infrequent.  
According to the International Commission on 
Large Dams (ICOLD 1995), an ‘incident’ is either a 
‘failure’ or an ‘accident’ requiring repair. A ‘failure’ 
is a collapse or movement of part of a dam or its 
foundation, to the extent that the dam cannot retain 
water. An ‘accident’ occurs, when a failure is pre-
vented by immediate remedial measures, possibly 
including drawing down the water. A large dam is a 
dam which is more than 15 meters in height (meas-
ured from the lowest point in the general founda-
tions to the crest of the dam).  
Many failures of embankment dams were trig-
gered by internal erosion. For instance in France, at 
the end of the last century, there was around one 
breach of a water retaining structure (flood em-
bankments, navigation canal embankments or small 
dams) per year caused by internal erosion.  Moreo-
ver, internal erosion is a threat not clearly defined 
and understood. For instance, analysis of stability is 
well-known and has been studied and taught at uni-
versities for a long time; in contrast, analysis of in-
ternal erosion was reduced to the study of uplift by 
Terzaghi and the piping rules of Lane and Bligh. To 
fill that gap, the Erinoh project was launched.  
That national research project was launched in 
2006 and completed in 2012 in order to better under-
stand the mechanisms of internal erosion and to re-
duce the damages caused by that hazard. Erinoh was 
responsible for bringing together partners, such as 
universities, owners and engineering offices, to in-
vestigate the mechanisms of internal erosion in 
dams, dikes and their foundations and to propose 
engineering solutions to reduce the impact of that 
hazard.  
Erinoh’s first task was to assemble, a database of 
internal erosion incidents, accidents and failures 
caused by internal erosion and by external erosion 
(overtopping) of water retaining structures, such as 
dams or dikes of retaining navigation or hydroelec-
tric canals and flood embankments or levees, mainly 
in France.  
In this paper, case studies are taken and statistics 
are calculated from the compilation of ICOLD 
Technical Bulletin 99 (ICOLD, 1995), Technical 
Bulletin 164 (ICOLD, 2015), the Erdata base (Foster 
et al, 1998), the NPDP program in the USA (Rich-
ards & Reddy, 2007) and the Erinoh database on in-
cidents developed by Paul Royet and the author.  
Internal erosion is commonly thought to be a haz-
ard that could strike an embankment dam at any 
time. However, careful investigation shows that in-
ternal erosion occurred mostly in particular situa-
tions (geology, design and loadings). The purpose of 
the first part of this paper is to point out the principal 
situations where failures by internal erosion were 
observed. 
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Mechanisms of internal erosion are hidden. Thus 
the main difficulty is to understand the different 
phases of development. To overcome that difficulty, 
physical models were built and tested in a laboratory 
with a 1/1 to 1/10 scale in order to understand the 
whole process.  
The purpose of the second part of this report is to 
point out the principal observations and conclusions 
on contact erosion and suffusion mechanisms. 
2 LESSONS FROM DAM FAILURES 
2.1 Omission of filters is the primary cause of 
internal erosion failures 
First of all, it is very important to underline that all 
the case histories reported in the Erinoh data base of 
failures of water retaining structures caused by in-
ternal erosion, showed no evidence of filters in the 
failed embankments, this is true of both for dams 
and dikes. For instance, all the failures of Loire lev-
ees (1846, 1856, 1866) involve heterogeneous em-
bankments, built and raised over  the centuries, 
without any filters and all the failures along the 
Rhone river (1993,1994, 2002, 2004) occurred in 
flood embankment without any filters.  
At first glance, this is not the case, for all the in-
ternal erosion failures of large dams, as reported by 
Foster et al. (1998). Five dams with filters failed: 
Baldwin Hills (1963), Teton (1976), Wadi Qattarah 
(1977) Quail Creek (1989), and Zoeknog (1993). 
These case studies are presented hereunder in order 
to understand why the filter was not effective in con-
trolling internal erosion in those cases. 
Baldwin Hills reservoir (H=47m at axis), water-
tight by a 3 m-thick compacted earth lining, was im-
pounded in 1951. Several problems occurred from 
1951 to 1963. The geological context, subject to tec-
tonic and seismic activity, regional subsidence, 
nearby major active faults and underlain by low den-
sity, dispersive residuals soils, is extremely difficult. 
An estimated maximum settlement of about 90 cm at 
the reservoir occurred between 1917 and 1963, the 
S-W corner dropping more than the N-E corner. The 
reservoir stretched a max of about 25 cm in the S-W 
direction. The failure was the result of large move-
ments on faults, possibly caused by oil extraction. 
The sand filter layer thickness was very small and 
completely inappropriate to control the very bad ge-
ology.  
Teton dam is a zoned embankment (H=93m) im-
pounded in 1976. The filter, omitted in the trench, 
was very thick under the shoulder. However, it was a 
natural alluvium with excessive % of plastic fines; 
its permeability was in some places as low as 10-7 
m/s. It was placed on jointed rock, with open joints 
not always sealed with gunite or concrete. In conse-
quence, the pipes, increasing from hydraulic frac-
tures through the core, were stopped by the filter, the 
flow was diverted into the unsealed cracks, passed 
the filter, exited on the downstream surface of the 
shell, developed backward erosion, and finally the 
hydraulic head below the filter fractured it.  
Wadi Qattarah dam (H=38m) was a homogene-
ous dam impounded in 1977. The embankment was 
protected by a chimney filter, the foundation by a 
filter carpet. However, the conduit was put in a 
trench through the rocky foundation, below the filter 
carpet. The trench was filled with the slightly disper-
sive embankment fill material. The trench walls 
were fractured and not protected by gunite. Back-
ward erosion initiated into the cracks, hydraulic 
cracking and concentrated leak (piping) occurred in 
the trench during the first impounding. 
The Quail Creek zoned dam (H=25m) failed at 
the end of impounding after three grouting cam-
paigns. The core containing up to 12% of salty soils 
(gypsum) was protected by a filter chimney but not 
by a filter carpet.  As the excavated rocky founda-
tion was very irregular, a series of troughs and peaks 
running from upstream to downstream, some layers 
of core material were placed between foundation and 
chimney filter to smooth the foundation surface. 
Those soil layers, no longer protected by filter, were 
eroded at contact of vertical fault gouges and gyp-
sum layer in foundation. 
Zoeknog dam case is similar to Wadi Qattarah. 
The outlet conduit was put in a trench through the 
foundation, below the filter carpet. The dispersive 
eolian silt was compacted around the outlet in the 
trench, whose the walls were not protected by gun-
ite. Backward erosion initiated into the cracks, hy-
draulic cracking and concentrated leak occurred in 
the trench. 
The assessment of the causes of failure of these 
five case studies show that in 3 cases, the filter was 
at the wrong location (3/5), in one case the geology 
was too bad for a dam site (1/5) and in the last case 
the transition was not pervious enough and was by-
passed and fractured by high water head (1/5). 
In conclusion, all the embankments designed 
without filter are at risk of failure by internal ero-
sion. However, failure could occur where filter is at 
the wrong location. The filter is the most effective 
safety barrier against internal erosion, but it is not 
enough: other safety barriers are required to protect 
a dam against any failure mode, in such a matter 
safety is ensured by “belt and braces” (Table 1).   
 
Table 1.  The main safety barriers designed to avoid 
the 3 main modes of failure.  
Mode of failure 1st safety barrier 2nd safety barrier 
Sliding Shoulder stability Drainage 
Internal erosion Filter Watertightness 
External erosion Spillway+freeboard D/S  protection 
 
Watertightness is the second barrier. Without water-
tightness of the foundation and dam body, the filter 
could be by-passed in very pervious or cracked 
foundations and/or fractured by the reservoir head. 
2.2 The most dangerous mechanism: the 
concentrated leak 
Internal erosion initiates in four mechanisms: con-
centrated leak, backward erosion, contact erosion 
and suffusion (Fell & Fry 2007, ICOLD 2015, Fig. 
1).  
 
  
  
 
Figure 1. The Four mechanisms of internal erosion (Fell & Fry 
2007). 
 
1. Concentrated leak erosion, first initiating mech-
anism of erosion, occurs where the sides of an 
opening may be eroded by the concentrated 
leakage flow through the opening in saturated 
clayey soil, and sometimes in unsaturated silty 
soil.  
2. Backward erosion involves the detachment of 
soils particles when the seepage exits to a free 
unfiltered surface, such as the ground surface of 
a sandy layer under a clayey dike, karsts in the 
foundation or the downstream face of a homoge-
neous embankment or a coarse rock fill zone.  
3. Contact erosion (also known as parallel contact 
erosion) involves erosion of fine particles from 
the contact with a coarser layer, caused by the 
flow passing through the coarser layer.  
4. Suffusion is erosion of internally unstable soils 
which involves selective erosion of finer parti-
cles from the matrix of coarser particles, in such 
a manner that the finer particles are removed 
through the voids between the larger particles by 
seepage flow, leaving behind a soil skeleton 
formed by the coarser particles.  
The statistics of failures collected by Foster & al., 
the NPDP program and ERINOH database show 
clearly that the most dangerous mechanism is the 
concentrated leak (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Statistics of the initiating mechanisms of in-
ternal erosion causing failures  
Mechanisms All dams Large dams Small dams 
 N % N % N % 
Concentrated leak 169 46 35 31 139 54 
Backward erosion 30 8 11 10 19 7 
Contact erosion 29 8 14 13 11 4 
Suffusion 4 1 1 1 5 2 
Unknown 139 37 50 45 85 33 
Total 371 100 111 100 259 100 
 
Concentrated leaks occur in flaws and defects. What 
are the most drastic and dangerous flaws? 
2.3 Openings along structures are the most 
dangerous flaws leading to failure  
Statistics of failures collected by Foster & Fell, the 
NPDP program and the ERINOH database encom-
passed in Table 3 show that the number of defects in 
dam bodies leading to failure is 4-5 times larger than 
those in foundations. 
 
Table 3. Statistics of the initiating path of internal 
erosion causing failures  
 
All dams Large Small 
Paths of internal erosion N % N % N % 
Through the embankment 203 55 50 45 153 59 
Through the foundation 44 12 18 16 26 10 
embankment- foundation   5 1 5 5 0 0 
Unknown 119 32 38 34 80 31 
Total 371 100 111 100 259 100 
 
The most dangerous defects are openings along 
structures (walls and aprons of spillways and con-
duits), followed by cracks through cohesive soils or 
geologically continuous voids in foundations (open 
faults, open vertical cracks, karsts). Erosion in open-
ings alongside structures passing through embank-
ments or foundations are the causes of one-third of 
the failures by internal erosion and one-half of the 
proven causes (Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Locations of defects leading to failure (Fos-
ter et al., NPDP program and ERINOH database)  
Locations All dams Large dams Small dams 
 N % N % N % 
Conduit 87 24% 22 20% 65 25% 
Core 8 2% 6 5% 2 1% 
Spillway 29 8% 7 6% 22 8% 
Fill 45 12% 6 5% 39 15% 
Foundation 36 10% 14 13% 22 8% 
Abutment 8 2% 6 5% 2 1% 
Upstream slope 3 1% 3 3% 3 1% 
Membrane 2 1% 2 2% 0 0 
Crest 5 1% 5 5% 5 2% 
Unknown 148 40% 40 36% 99 39% 
Total 371 100% 111 100% 259 100% 
 
Cracks and openings are triggered by two main 
phenomena:  
• relative displacement and,  
• hydraulic fracture. 
2.4 Failures initiated in the dam body after 10 
years of operation   
Of the 35 failures of large dams, initiated by internal 
erosion in the embankment dam body within the 20th 
century, reported by Foster & Fell (1998), only 9 oc-
curred after 10 years of operation (Table 5). Among 
these 9 failures, only a few failures (3/9) occurred on 
dams built within the 20th century (highlighted in 
grey in Table 5). At least 6 failures (6/9) occurred in 
homogeneous embankments without filters. 
 
Table 5. Failures of large dams after 1900 and after 
more than 10 years of operation (Foster et al. 1998)  
Name Zoning H 
(m) 
Completion  Failure  
Kantalai homogeneous 27 612 1986 
Emery homogeneous 16 1850 1966 
Utica homogeneous 21 1873 1902 
Avalon II homogeneous 18 1894 1904 
Toreson ? 15 1898 1953 
Mill Creek  ? 20 1899 1957 
Smartt Sindicate homogeneous 28 1912 1961 
Pampulha Zoned fill 18 1941 1954 
Caulk Lake homogeneous 20 1950 1973 
2.5 Failures of large dams initiated in foundations   
2.5.1 Failures by Year of construction 
The main defects in dam foundations, inherent in the 
site geology, result in two different failure paths, as 
follows:  
• cracks, where the walls are eroded by the water 
leaking through them (marked F in Table 6),  
• openings, triggering backward erosion or contact 
erosion of the embankment material through the 
foundation (marked F+E in Table 6).  
 
Table 6. List of large dams failures within the 20th 
century triggered by foundation defects (Foster et al, 
1998). The TE type is earthfill and ER is Rockfill.  
Name Type Construction Failure Path 
Hauser Lake I Steel 1906 1908 F 
Black Rock (A) TE/ER 1907 1909 F 
Julesberg (B) TE 1905 1911 F 
Horse Creek  TE 1912 1914 F+E 
Lake Toxaway TE 1902 1916 F 
Blyderivier TE 1924 1922 F 
Log Falls TIM 1921 1923 F 
Corpus Christi TE 1930 1930 F 
Lower Khajuri TE/PG 1949 1949 F 
Alamo Arroyo Site 
2 
TE 1960 1960 F 
Jennings Creek No3 TE 1962 1963 F 
Baldwin Hills TE 1951 1963 F 
Jennings Creek 
No16 
TE 1960 1964 F 
Nanak Sagar TE 1962 1967 F 
La Laguna TE 1912 1969 F 
Manivali TE 1975 1976 F+E 
Teton TE/ER 1976 1976 F+E 
El Salto TE  1976 F 
Wadi Qattarah TE 1972 1977 F+E 
Ruahihi Canal TE 1981 1981 F 
Embalse Aromos TE 1979 1984 F 
Quail Creek TE 1984 1988 F+E 
Zoeknog TE 1993 1993 F+E 
2.5.2 Failures initiated in the foundation after more 
than 10 years: caste history of La Laguna dam 
The dams highlighted in grey in Table 6 were built 
during the 20th century and failed after more than ten 
years. No information was found on Lake Toxaway, 
and Baldwin Hills was discussed above. La Laguna 
dam is the only case of failure at long term: it failed 
after more than 60 years of operation. The embank-
ment comprises an upstream zone of silts and clays 
compacted by hand and a downstream zone of soil 
and stones placed in layers. A one meter thick core 
wall of concrete or masonry separates the upstream 
and downstream zones. The core wall penetrates 2-
5m into the underlying foundation soils. The dam is 
founded on residual soils (laterite) derived from 
weathered tuff and basalt. The foundation soils 
comprise high plasticity silts and clays. Sedimenta-
tion tests indicated that the soils did not flocculate in 
reservoir water (i.e., they were dispersive). Horizon-
tal permeability tests conducted in boreholes indi-
cated that the foundation soils were highly pervious, 
with permeability in the order of 10-4 m/s. ‘Basaltic 
pudding’, interpreted as weathered basalt with core 
stones, underlies the residual soils. The permeability 
of this material is also relatively high. Seepage was 
observed emerging at several locations 10 to 20 m 
downstream of the dam toe after first filling of the 
reservoir in 1908 (Fig. 2).  
 
 
Legend 
A Spillway crest level 
B Water level at failure 
C Large trees 
D Seepage emerges 
since first filling - long 
term increase in flow 
1 “Basaltic pudding” weathered 
basalt with corestones 
2 Decomposed tuff and basaltic 
clays and silts k=10-4m/s  
3 Volcanic ash layer (depth un-
known) 
4 Soil and stones 5 Clay 6 wall 
Figure 2. The Laguna Dam – section at location of failure. 
 
Seepage flows are measured by two weirs, one on 
each abutment. The seepage flows on the right 
abutment are relatively constant with time; however 
there is an apparent long-term trend of increasing 
seepage at maximum reservoir level on the left 
abutment. This is reflected in the plot of seepage vs. 
reservoir level. Fig. 3 shows the history of seepage 
measurements for the left abutment from 1927 up to 
the time of failure. From 1960 to 1968, the reservoir 
did not reach max reservoir level and the seepage 
flows were lower than preceding 5 years.  
 
In mid September 
1969, the meas-
ured seepage flow 
on the left abut-
ment exceeded the 
highest previous 
recorded flow of 
30 L/s. This did 
not cause alarm as 
the total seepage 
was 50 L/s lower 
than the total seep-
age of 78 L/s rec-
orded in 1942. 
Figure 3. Monitoring of leakage at Laguna Dam. Rate of dis-
charge versus reservoir elevation at different years.  
 
During the remainder of September 1969, the res-
ervoir level and all of October remained constant at 
about Elevation 2182.8, however the seepage flow 
on the left abutment continued to increase and by 
October 25 it was 55 L/s. Early in the morning of 31 
October 1969, the measured seepage on the left 
abutment increased again and was 75 L/s. At about 
6pm of the same day, a hole with water issuing un-
der pressure was observed on the left abutment. The 
concentrated leak increased rapidly and started to 
erode the downstream slope of the dam. At 
10:45pm, the masonry cutoff wall was exposed and 
a few minutes later the embankment was breached. 
Photographs taken after the failure show the pres-
ence of small piping holes within the weathered vol-
canic tuff exposed by the breach (Marsal and 
Pohlenz, 1972). Foster et al. (1998) believe the pres-
ence of large trees immediately at the downstream 
toe of the embankment and tree roots in the founda-
tion may have contributed to the formation of the in-
itial concentrated seepage path. In any case, the in-
ternal erosion process was very slow and could have 
been detected by monitoring. 
2.5.3 Failures versus Geology type 
Foster et al. (1998) considered it appropriate to use 
the distribution of geology types from six countries 
(Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, UK and 
USA) to compare the distribution of geology types 
to  world-wide examples of failures caused by inter-
nal erosion.  The comparison is presented in Table 7 
for the both of the principal types of geology: soil 
and rock. The estimated distributions of foundation 
geology types for the selected countries are summa-
rized in the right-hand column of soil and rock geol-
ogy.  The estimated distributions of geology types in 
the failure cases world-wide during the 20th century 
are summarized in the left-hand columns of both 
types of geology. Geology types highlighted in grey 
are over-represented and more susceptible to internal 
erosion. There is the same number of failures for soil 
type geology and rock type geology: 10. 
 
Table 7. Comparison of estimated distributions of 
geology types in the failures to those in dam pro-
jects.  
SOIL type: 10 failures ROCK type : 10 failures 
% failures % of soil type % failures % of rock type 
50% alluvial 56%   alluvial 20% sanstone 21%  sanstone 
10% glacial 19%   glacial 20% shale 21%  shale 
30% residual 8%  residual 40% limestone 7%   limestone 
 7% colluvial  7%   granite 
 6%  eolian  7%   gneiss 
 2%  marine  7%   schist 
 1%lacustrine  6%   siltite 
10% volcanic 1%  volcanic 20% volcanic 10% volcanic 
   14%  others, 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The most dangerous situations are: 
1. In soil type geology: residual soils and volcanic 
soils. 
o The susceptibility of residual soils is associated 
with dispersive soils (2/3 cases). 
o The weakness of volcanic soils is associated 
with high permeabilities and voids. 
o The good performance of glacial soils is associ-
ated with slow suffusion processes. 
2. In rock type geology: limestone and volcanic 
rocks. 
o The susceptibility of limestone rock is associat-
ed with large cavities. 
o The weakness of volcanic rocks is associated 
with large permeabilities and open joins. 
o The good performance of granite soils is associ-
ated with slow suffusion processes. Suffusion is 
frequent and explains the high number of inci-
dents but suffusion is usually slow enough to in-
tervene before failure. 
2.6 Failures of old navigation canal embankments  
The Erinoh database contains 45 cases of problems 
on dikes for navigation or hydropower canals. The 
retaining embankments of navigation canals, built in 
France during the 19th century with small widths, no 
zoning, steep slopes, poorly maintained with little 
surveillance suffered 14 failures. The locations 
where internal erosion initiated and the types of situ-
ation leading to failures are described in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. The 14 failures of old canal sites (Erinoh)  
Canal site Along ad-
joining 
structure 
Water 
tightness 
protection 
Contact 
Initiation 
at crest 
Uncommon 
situation? 
Arroux Yes (junc-
tion) 
 Yes  
Montambert Yes (junc-
tion) 
  Just after 
long empty 
period 
Houillères  Yes   
Marseille les 
Aubigny 
 Yes Yes  
Micaudière Yes 
(aqueduct) 
  During  
aqueduct 
works 
Bief partage 
Vosges 
Yes 
(aqueduct) 
   
Ponthion  Yes Yes  
Velaines  Yes Yes  
Moeuvres    Frost 
Languevoisin Yes    
Allenjoie Yes?     
Jonchet Yes  
(conduit) 
 Yes  
Briennon  Yes  Fallen 
Tree? 
Masnière  Yes Yes  
 
The main causes of failures of these old retaining 
navigation canal embankments are: 
1- Internal erosion initiated at junction or transi-
tion, in the great majority of these case studies: 
1.1 At a contact between soil and structure, or  
1.2 Between two watertight materials, or  
1.3 Between the watertightness and protection 
materials.  
2- Slopes were stiff: H/V=1,5/1 with protection by 
concrete slabs or short sheet piles.  
3- Desiccation and frost situations were involved 
in some failures.  
4- Leaks were seen several days to several years 
before failure, in half of these case studies. 
The consequences of failures were low: there were 
no fatalities.  
2.7 Breaches on flood embankments  
The ERINOH database completed in 2014, recorded, 
without being exhaustive, 207 incidents on river 
embankments in France between the 18th century 
and today. External erosion (overtopping) caused 
most of these incidents, but in a large number of old 
incidents, the cause remains undetermined. Internal 
erosion has been identified as cause of incidents in 
32 % of the total number of cases. In total, 70% of 
these incidents led to the total breach. 
 
Table 9. Mechanisms leading to incidents on fluvial 
levees  
Mechanism Total Internal  
erosion 
External 
erosion 
both 
erosions 
Unknown 
Number 207 59 77 6 65 
% 100 29 37 3 31 
 
The breaches represent 60% of internal erosion 
incidents of flood embankments (48 of 65 docu-
mented cases); cases of piping erosions without 
breaching represent 22%. The presence of animal 
burrows, tree roots or conduits passing through the 
levee is reported in one third of cases (but given the 
number of insufficiently documented cases, this pro-
portion should be higher). In the recent years, the 
delta of the Rhône River was subject to major floods 
in 1993, 1994, 2002 and 2003. During the 1993 and 
1994 floods, 16 partial or total breaches were report-
ed, none due to overtopping. Internal erosion was 
the mechanism involved in those ruptures, 3 concen-
trated leaks occurred along pipes crossing levees 
(3/16) and concentrated leaks after burrowing were 
identified as the cause of other 13 breaches (13/16). 
2.8 Conclusions on failures 
(1) All embankments without filters are at risk of 
failure by internal erosion. The filter is the most ef-
fective barrier against internal erosion. However, de-
sign of a good filter is not enough; at least another 
safety barrier is required: watertightness of the dam 
body and of the foundation. 
(2) The concentrated leak is the most dangerous 
mechanisms of internal erosion, amongst the four in-
itiating mechanisms. 
(3) The most dangerous defects are openings along 
adjoining structures (walls and apron of spillway and 
conduits) followed by cracks through cohesive soils 
or geologically continuous voids in foundations 
(open faults, open cracks, karsts). 
(4) Only three failures of large dams initiated by in-
ternal erosion through the dam body occurred on 
dams built after 1900 and operated at least 10 years. 
Two of them presented signs of internal erosion dur-
ing operation, no information was found on the third 
breached dam. Careful surveillance should be able to 
capture such signs and intervention should be able to 
stop internal erosion on the other dams in operation. 
(5) Of the two geology types, soil and rock, the most 
susceptible to internal erosion of the soils are: resid-
ual soils and volcanic soils; and of the rock types 
are: limestone and volcanic rocks. 
(6) The old embankments retaining navigation ca-
nals and old flood embankments are very susceptible 
to internal erosion: upgrading with chimney filter 
and filter around the pipe, associated with careful 
surveillance of damages caused by animals and veg-
etation and of the effects of ageing of transitions, are 
the main requirements to prevent failure in the long 
term. 
3 LESSONS FROM PHYSICAL MODELS 
3.1 The issues 
3.1.1 What is the failure process of river dikes con-
structed of alluvial soils? 
No failures of dikes for hydropower canals con-
structed with alluvial soils have been recorded in the 
Erinoh database.  The design of hydropower canals 
dikes, built after 1930, mainly after 1950, with 
zoned embankments, large crest widths, gentle 
slopes, well-maintained with thorough surveillance, 
may explain that no failures of modern canal em-
bankments occurred in France. Of the 25 accidents 
(incidents which did not lead to failure), sinkholes 
occurred at 9, piping was detected early and stopped 
at 13, and there were 7 cases of landslides and slope 
erosions. Most of accidents were triggered by con-
tact erosion or suffusion. The questions are: “how 
contact erosion and suffusion could lead to breach-
ing of such dikes? Why contact erosion and suffu-
sion triggered less failures than concentrated leaks 
and backward erosion” (see Table 2).  
 
 
Figure 4: Incident on a river dike caused by contact erosion be-
tween core silt and foundation gravel. 
 
Fig.4 shows a dike case study where a typical ac-
cident occurred. The contact between the silty core 
and the gravelly foundation was tested in a physical 
model in order to answer the question. Usually con-
tact erosion tests are carried out on small scale mod-
els 40 to 60 cm long. Sellmeijer (2011) noticed a 
scale effect in backward erosion. Is there in contact 
erosion as well? May we rely on the results of the 
small scale laboratory tests ? To answer these ques-
tions, a model at 1/1 scale was built and results at 
small and large scales were compared. The progress 
of contact erosion was checked by measuring dis-
charge flow, turbidity, settlement and pore pressure.  
3.1.2 What is the mode of failure of a zoned dam 
with filters? 
Filters protect dams from internal erosion. However, 
the filter is a necessary but not sufficient barrier 
against dam failure caused by internal erosion (see 
section 2.5). In some situations, the filter can be by-
passed by concentrated leaks. For instance, the large 
silty core of Teton dam was protected by large tran-
sition zones. It is the only failure of all the dams de-
signed by the Bureau of Reclamation. More than one 
hundred large dams were designed successfully by 
the Bureau with large transitions; so why did this 
one fail, as shown in Figure 5? 
 
  
10h: Leak of turbid flow  10h45: Flow increasing  
  
11h20: dozer lost in a sinkhole 11h55: breach 
 
Figure 5: Progression of failure at Teton dam from Snorteland.   
 
The two review panels concluded that piping or 
seepage erosion was the failure mechanism. The 
core-to-shell downstream transition zone gradation 
did not meet either the Bureau of Reclamation crite-
ria or the older, widely accepted Terzaghi-Bertram 
criteria. Was the gradation the initiator of the fail-
ure?  It was only part of the cause of the failure. The 
failure investigations found open foundation cracks. 
Most experts who have reviewed the failure agree 
that there was also hydraulic fracturing of the silty 
core. Following Sherard’s (1987) assumption that 
the whole base of the core was being eroded in such 
a manner that the reservoir head was applied at the 
contact or below the downstream filter, what condi-
tions were necessary for the seepage flow passing 
along and through the transition filter to crack it and 
open a hole in the downstream shoulder? Assuming 
that the safety barrier made by water tightness was 
broken and the filter was the only safety barrier, 
what was the other safety barrier, which could have 
saved the downstream shell from the failure? 
3.2 Testing procedure and materials 
All tests were carried out at CACOH laboratory 
(CNR Lyon) in a view of evaluating where and 
when contact erosion could cause the failure of the 
levee (Beguin 2011). They were built in a reinforced 
concrete structure open on its downstream side and 
upper surface, providing a useful volume 4 m in 
width, 8 m in length and 2.25 m in height (Fig. 6). 
The upstream water level was regulated from a res-
ervoir located behind the wall at the upstream end of 
the test rig. The foundation layer was connected to 
the reservoir at its upstream and discharged down-
stream into a settling tank equipped with a spillway. 
The level of water in the upstream reservoir was in-
creased by successive steps, varying the horizontal 
flow velocity at the base of the levee. These tests 
were reported by Beguin (2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Construction of the reinforced concrete structure for 
testing the large scale models. 
 
The tested materials in the foundation are two 
coarse and pervious rounded alluvium gravels with 
narrow grain size distributions: 12/20 mm with Cu = 
1.4 and 20/40 mm with Cu = 1.5 (Figure 7).  
 The core of the embankment is made of a fine al-
luvium, a sandy-silt dredged from Bourg-Lès-
Valence, one of the most erodible silts of the Rhone, 
with d50 = 0.14 mm, d85 = 0.025 mm and 2% < 
0.002mm, Cu = 85. The gradings are shown in Fig.7. 
The shoulder on the core material is made of: 
• Chavanay alluvium: a highly suffusive alluvium  
Cu=48, 27% < 0.080mm; k=0.001-0.002 m/s. 
• 4/50mm: a stable and very pervious rounded grav-
el d10 = 5 mm, d50 = 18 mm, Cu = 4 and 0 <80 mi-
crons <2%; k=0.1 to 0.18 m/s. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Grain size distribution curves of the core silt, founda-
tion gravels (10/20 & 20/40) and shoulder fill materials : un-
stable alluvium from Chavanay and stable 4/50. 
3.3 First series of models: sinkhole process 
The models are focused on the progression of con-
tact erosion at the interface between the gravelly 
foundation and the silty core of river flood embank-
ments (Fig. 8), compacted in 20 cm thick layers, at a 
dry density of 1520 kg/m3 or 92% of standard Proc-
tor optimum density. The foundation material is 
made of the 12/20 mm gravel. That gravel was too 
coarse to filter and retain the silt core, and continu-
ing erosion could therefore occur. These two materi-
als were selected in a view to modeling the worst 
situation of contact erosion. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Model for the 3 tests (1, 2 & 3) focused on sinkholes. 
 
Duration of the first test was 99 hours. Four steps 
of hydraulic load were applied by varying the water 
level in the upstream reservoir (Fig. 9). During the 
three first steps, a peak of turbidity and transported 
fines were observed in water as soon as the step 
commenced. The phase of fines transport lasted 
about one hour and then stopped.  
 
 
Figure 9. The change of upstream head, discharge flow and 
turbidity versus time 
 
 
Figure 10. The changes of piezometric line in the gravelly 
foundation, caused by clogging of downstream toe. 
  
Figure 11. The settlement isocontours in plan versus time. 
 
  
 
Figure 12. The sinkhole at the end of the test 1 (after 99h). 
 
At Hour 79 during the last step (at an upstream 
head of 2.5 m and flow rate of 20 L/s), a massive 
surge of transported fines transport was suddenly 
triggered. The eroded fines came from the upstream 
part of the model. At Hour 83, the flow rate began to 
decrease at constant head. There was a sharp de-
crease of hydraulic head under the downstream part 
of the model. This was the consequence of a de-
crease of the downstream permeability (as shown in 
Fig. 10). At Hour 84, downstream settlement oc-
curred (Fig. 11). At Hour 96, a sinkhole occurred 
along the upstream wall (Fig. 12). At Hour 99, at the 
end of the test, the flow rate stabilized at12 L/s, and 
the turbidity dropped towards zero. 
The interpretation of the data is that during the 
three first steps, erosion at the contact interface was 
brief, the gravel was merely washed. The massive 
erosion occurred at the last step under a Darcy flow 
velocity of 3.5 cm/s and hydraulic gradient of 0.28 
in the gravelly foundation. This massive transport of 
eroded silt leads to clogging of the gravel and a de-
crease in the flow velocity. This arrested the contact 
erosion. The sinkhole was observed at Hour 17 fol-
lowing the start of the massive erosion. Its location 
near the wall was a boundary effect, although it 
should have been prevented by the geotextile protec-
tion! The same process was observed in Tests 2 and 
3, but at higher flow velocities and increased erosion 
rates, with the 20/40 mm gravel in foundation. Inter-
estingly, with the 20/40 mm gravel, the contact ero-
sion was increased and the silt was subject to suffu-
sion: some fine particles were washed out in the 
sinkhole collapse chimney and sand lenses were 
founded blocked by the coarsest particles of the silt 
at the base of sinkhole chimney just above the grav-
elly foundation (Fig. 13). The coarse particles played 
the role of a natural filter, stopping contact erosion 
at their location. However, the contact erosion 
moved downstream and could cause a second sink-
hole (see test 3 Fig. 13).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. The segregated areas (coarse particles and sand 
lenses) at the end of the test 2 (above) and 3 (below). 
 
That paving of coarse particles has been observed by 
Beguin (2011), it decreases the erosion rate and 
sometimes it stops the contact erosion. This for-
mation of natural filter in alluvium is a first explana-
tion for the low rate of contact erosion and lack of 
failure in embankment made of fine alluvium on 
coarse alluvium foundation. 
3.4 Second series of models: from contact erosion 
to concentrated leak erosion 
The second series of 8 models (4 to 12) is focused 
on the progression of contact erosion at the down-
stream toe of river flood embankments as shown in 
Figure 14. The fill in the body of the levee was the 
fine silty alluvium, used in the first series of tests 
with in addition a thin layer of gravelly fill above the 
silty shoulder (Fig. 15). The levee was founded on 
the coarse and pervious rounded alluvium used in 
the first series (see gradings Fig. 8).  
 
 
 
Figure 14. The dike studied in the second series of models 
(from Beguin  2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Large scale of levee suffering contact erosion stud-
ied in the second series of models (from Beguin 2011). 
 
It is well-known that a granular soil cannot hold a 
roof (Fell & Fry 2007). Consequently, in a zoned 
levee, transitions or gravel shoulders should stop 
piping through a core. Unfortunately, this is not al-
ways true. Hydraulic fracture, heave or sliding can 
jeopardize the filter role. For instance, in tests car-
ried out at CACOH laboratory, CNR and EDF ob-
served that piping could fracture a 20 cm gravelly 
shoulder of a 2 m high levee prototype. 
As the Darcy flow velocity passed 2 cm/s in the 
gravel, the turbidity at the downstream toe increased. 
The flow began to carry away the gravel from the 
downstream shoulder. After a period of time lasting 
from several minutes to several hours, a true erosion 
pipe emerged on the downstream face and through it 
a very substantial flow was discharged as shown in 
Figure 16.  
 
 
 
 
Fig.16: Piping exit in a levee suffering contact erosion (from 
Beguin, 2011). 
 
Based on this result, it appears that contact erosion 
could lead to the failure of levees if the following 
four conditions are met. 
(1) There is continuing erosion between gravel and 
silt (i.e. no filtering, when 9.d85core < d15 shoulder); 
(2) The Darcy velocity is higher than 2 cm/s in the 
gravel; 
(3) The pipe in the core does not collapse. 
(4) The shoulder fill layer is too thin.  
As no failures of EDF or CNR levees have been 
caused by contact erosion during the last 60 years, at 
least one of the four conditions did not occur on site. 
In reality, the downstream shoulder is thicker than 
that modeled. This leads to the next question: “could 
the piping be stopped by a thicker gravelly shoulder?  
To answer that, another large scale test was car-
ried out with a 130 cm (vertical) deep gravel shoul-
der. The shoulder material was also changed, to be 
more representative of the suffusive used alluvium 
(Fig. 8) or in the terminology used by Kenney & Lau 
(1985, 1986), susceptible to internal instability. 
Although the upstream head was 2.1 m and con-
tact erosion of the silt was continuing at a Darcy 
flow velocity higher than 2 cm/s in the foundation, 
no failure occurred after several days of continuing 
erosion. The test was repeated twice to be sure that 
the 1.3m thick shoulder could withstand the hydrau-
lic forces imposed on the shoulder fill by the water 
head emerging from the foundation (Table 9). 
 
Table 9. Results of contact erosion tests with 1.3m 
thick shoulder.   
Test Initiation Progression Failure Visual in-
spection 
 V 
(cm/s) 
i  Eroded silt 
mass (kg) 
   
2.1 2.6  0.23 965  no Sinkhole in 
progress un-
der the crest 
2.2 2.9  0.23 1625  no Leakage with 
unraveling, 
but which 
soon stopped 
2.3 2.3  0.15 675 no - 
 
In Test 2.2 global backward erosion occurred and 
excavated a gully from the toe to the top of the slope 
as shown in Figure 17. It looked similar to the up-
ward erosion observed on the downstream face of 
the Teton dam. 
 
 
At 10h53’10’’  after 50h02 of test 
 
At 10h53’13’’ 
 
At 10h53’15’’ 
 
At 10h54’57’’ 
 
At 10h56’00’’ 
 
At 11h10 
 
At 11h51’after 53,7h of test 
 
End of test 10/08/2012 at 8h after 
 
Figure 17: Progression of erosion on the downstream face of 
test 2.2 
 
The reason for this upward progression is the clog-
ging of the shoulder by eroded silt. The materials 
appeared to be less compacted and the silt dryer in 
Test 2.2 than in the other tests. The exit of the flow 
was plugged by the eroded silt, and the erosion of 
the shoulder fill progressed upwards near the surface 
of the slope (Fig. 18). 
 
 
Figure 18: Interpretation of the progression of erosion on the 
downstream face of test 2.2 
 
These former tests have demonstrated that a thick 
shoulder can stop piping through the core, the latter 
that a thin shoulder cannot: what is the minimum 
thickness of the downstream shoulder to prevent the 
failure of the levee? 
3.5 Third series of models: global backward 
erosion 
3.5.1 Objective and testing procedure 
In this third series, only the behavior of the shoul-
der fill was studied. to resolve the previous question 
by determining both the mechanism of shoulder fail-
ure and the criterion for protecting the shoulder from 
the failure. Three different mechanisms of failures 
may occur: (1) general instability without hydraulic 
fracturing, (2) hydraulic fracturing followed by pip-
ing, (3) backward erosion and surface plane sliding. 
Two kinds of materials were used in the shoulder: 
the pervious and stable 4/50 and the suffusive allu-
vium of Chavanay (Fig. 8). 
3.5.2 Shoulder with pervious and stable gravel 
Two kinds of flow were injected at the base of the 
shoulder:  
• 2D with 5 injector pipes (see Plan View Fig.19) 
• Concentrated leak by a single central pipe. 
 
 
Figure 19. Sketch of the third series of models (Beguin 2011). 
 
Test 3.1 2D flow erosion initiation Hw=0.9 m shoulder thick-
ness h=1.5 m 
 
Test 3.1 2D flow - Failure. Hw=1.66 m h=1.5 m. 
 
Test 3.5 Concentrated leak - No failure. Hw >3 m h=1 m.  
 
Test 3.7 Concentrated leak Hw >3 m h=0.5 m. Heave & 
backward erosion on a stable gravel. 
 
Figure 20. Progression of erosion or not with a very pervious 
shoulder. 
 
The very pervious material was lightly compacted 
by 2 passes of vibrating plate (ρd = 1760 kg/m3 and 
w = 2%).  
The shoulder fill could withstand the very high 
water heads imposed by the concentrated leak 
emerging from the erosion pipe (see test 3.5 in Table 
10). Very high head loss was measured in the shoul-
der near the pipe exit in test 3.5, resulting in the lack 
of failure even with 1 m thick shoulder resisting 3.05 
m reservoir head (see test 3.5 in Figure 20). Hydrau-
lic heave did not occur with 3m reservoir head. 
The reservoir head causing failure is much lower, 
where the flow is 2D (see test 3.1 in Table 10). The 
results are compiled in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Results of very pervious shoulder tests.  
Test Shoulder 
thickness 
Type of flow Reservoir 
head at 
failure 
Visual inspec-
tion of the 
mechanism 
3.1 1.5 m 2D 1.66 m Global Back-
ward erosion. 
Progressive 
heave 
3.5 1.5 m re-
duced to 1 
m 
Concentrated 
leak 
> 3.05 m No failure 
3.7 0.5 m Concentrated 
leak 
3.05 m Backward ero-
sion and sud-
den blow-out  
3.5.3 Shoulder with suffusive alluvium 
The suffusive alluvium was tested because it was at 
first sight the worst type of shoulder fill due to the 
potential for suffusion. The average gradation of the 
alluvium is shown on Figure 8. The initial state was 
ρd = 2100 kg/m3 and w = 4%. The mechanism of 
failure it was markedly different to that through the 
very pervious shoulder, it developed in the following 
phases. 
 
 
Dike crest (plan view) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Surface sliding  
caused by 2D flow un-
der the shoulder made 
of suffusive alluvium. 
 
 
 
 
Toe 
 
Crest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) Horizontal crack 
and sudden increase of 
discharge flow through 
the crack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Toe 
 
Crest 
 
 
 
Leak 
 
 
(3) Scour or slough-
ing downstream and 
below the crack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Downstream toe 
 
Figure 21. Photos of the failure of a shoulder made with alluvi-
um caused by 2D flow. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) local sliding and 
crack caused by the 
concentrated leak 
under the shoulder 
made of suffusive al-
luvium. 
 
 
 
 
(2) Horizontal 
crack and sudden in-
crease of discharge 
flow through the 
crack. 
  
 
(3) Scour or 
sloughing down-
stream and below the 
crack. 
 
 
Figure 22. Failure of a shoulder made with suffusive alluvium 
caused by a concentrated leak. 
3.6 Interpretation 
3.6.1 Scale effect in contact erosion 
The comparisons between the critical hydraulic gra-
dients in Fig. 23 and the Darcy flow velocities in 
Fig. 24 respectively, measured in small scale appa-
ratus and those measured in the large scale apparatus 
shows the influence of the thickness of the gravel 
layer.  
 
 
 
Figure 23. Critical hydraulic gradients at small and large 
scales. 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Critical hydraulic Darcy flow velocities at small and 
large scale. 
 
Higher critical hydraulic gradients occurred when 
the gravel layer was clogged by the transported 
fines. Thinner is the gravel layer, larger is the clog-
ging and larger are the threshold values: that is the 
explanation of the higher values at small scale. The 
scatter of the critical values of the hydraulic gradient 
is larger than the scatter of the critical values of the 
Darcy flow velocity. The minimum critical value of 
Darcy flow velocities at small scale, 2 cm/s, is equal 
to the minimum value of Darcy flow velocities at 
large scale (It is not the same for the hydraulic gra-
dient). According to the large pore sizes of the grav-
el, the permeability is not constant: it follows the 
Forcheimer relationship; the Darcy flow velocity 
gives a better threshold of contact erosion. Based on 
that result, we can conclude that with enough thick 
gravel layers, there is no scale effect on the critical 
value of Darcy flow velocity. However the critical 
hydraulic flow velocity can be increased by clogging 
of the thin gravel layer (< 20 cm).  
The observed critical flow velocity is the start of 
a continuing transport of fines, eroded from the silt 
contact. It does mean than below that critical flow 
velocity there is no erosion. The figure 25 shows the 
trend of the erosion rate measured in the first 30 
minutes of the tests: the threshold value is not seen 
on that figure.  
 
 
 
Figure 25. Mass erosion rate versus measured in the 2 small 
scale tests and the 9 large scale tests (Beguin 2011). 
 
Erosion occurs with a Darcy flow velocity lower 
than the critical value, however that erosion decreas-
es and stops quickly; after the transport of the finest 
particles, the largest particles lay down on the con-
tact and do a temporary open filter, up to a new in-
crease of the flow velocity.  
The laboratory tests capture only short term phe-
nomena. The influence of little changes of hydraulic 
heads occurring during small floods on long term is 
not simulated in the laboratory. This effect does not 
look negligible. On some river embankment, linear 
settlements versus time are observed. The estimated 
settlement rate is between 2mm/year and 1cm/year. 
The mass erosion rates associated with the previous 
settlement rates in the foundation are between 1E-
10kg/s/m2 and 5E-10kg/s/m2, far below the meas-
ured erosion rate in laboratory. This erosion is sup-
posed to be triggered by Darcy flow velocity below 
the critical value. 
3.6.2 Effect of suffusion 
It is interesting to note that the effect of suffusion on 
the behavior of the unstable Chavanay gravel has 
three phases: the first is the detachment and 
transport of fines, the second is the clogging of 
gravel by transported fines leading to a decrease of 
permeability (Fig. 26) and the third is the hydraulic 
fracture leading to crack formation and sudden re-
lease of leakage. The initiation of the first step was 
difficult to observe, the second step was observed 
under a large range of values of hydraulic gradient 
and the third step triggered the shoulder failure or 
backward erosion. It is difficult to define a critical 
value of the hydraulic gradient from the measure-
ments of permeability in the oedo-permeameter of 
the GeM (Fig.26). 
 
 
Figure 26. Hydraulic gradient and permeability of the Cha-
vanay gravel (Marot & al 2014). 
 
In some experiments the permeability has been 
decreasing since the lowest value of the hydraulic 
gradient, in some others there is a clear decrease for 
hydraulic gradients i higher than 0,6. The value 
ic=0,6 is in agreement with the critical hydraulic 
gradient defined by Li (2008).  However the scatter 
of the critical hydraulic gradient is one more time 
observed in the large scale tests. In Figure 27, the 
critical gradient ic=0,6 is compared to the calculated 
hydraulic gradient nearby the pore pressure cell de-
tecting in the large scale tests a first change and a 
large change of pore pressure,  assuming signs of 
massive transport of fines. From the pore pressure 
cells the critical hydraulic gradient increase with the 
vertical stress (the height of the shoulder). This point 
needs clarification. 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Comparison of critical hydraulic gradients for the 
suffusive Chavanay alluvium. 
3.6.3 Hydraulic fracturing and instability 
Hydraulic fracturing may have occurred causing first 
the crack and secondly the leak in the large scale 
tests and contributed to the local or global sliding. 
The hydrostatic pore pressure in the reservoir at fail-
ure was equivalent to the total normal stress on a 
plane parallel to the downstream face (equation 1) 
for 2D flow, and higher for a concentrated leak. 
Thus, the effective normal stress σ’n = 0, applied at 
the exit of the pipe, should be a criterion for the fail-
ure of the semi-pervious downstream shoulder sub-
jected to the pressure of 2D flow, and a conservative 
one for shoulder protecting the dam core from a 
concentrated leak.  The results of comparisons be-
tween calculated total stress σn and measured pore 
pressure u at failure are compiled in Table 11. 
 
σ’n =γ.h.cos2(β)-u  (1) 
 
With σ’n effective normal stress, γ  wet unit 
weight of the shoulder, h  thickness of the shoulder 
(vertical distance), β  slope angle and u pore pres-
sure. 
 
Table 11. Results of shoulder tests with suffusive al-
luvium.  
Test Shoulder 
thickness 
(m) 
Type of flow reservoir 
pressure 
at failure 
(kPa) 
Total 
stress 
(kPa) 
Visual inspec-
tion of the 
mechanism 
3.2 1.5 m 2D 28  29  Sliding 
3.3 1.5 m 2D 29  29.7  Sliding 
3.4 0.5 m Concentrated 
leak 
11,3  9.3  Local sliding, 
crack and 
scour 
3.6 1 m  Concentrated 
leak 
>30  19  No failure 
3.8 0.65 m Concentrated 
leak 
15,7  12.7  Local sliding, 
crack and 
scour 
3.6.4 Application and discussion 
For assessing the safety of a zoned dam or a zoned 
levee, focusing on the risk of internal erosion, a dis-
tinction has to be made between two shoulder types: 
• Shoulders with very large drainage capacity (in 
these cases discharge flows from concentrated leaks 
are far lower than the discharge capacity of the 
shoulder or permeability larger than 0.1 m/s, i.e. 
rockfill or clean gravel) and, 
• Shoulders with fair drainage capacity (discharge 
flow from concentrated leaks similar to the dis-
charge capacity of the shoulder or permeability 
around 0.001 m/s, i.e. alluvium). 
The large drainage capacity shoulders have to be 
protected from backward erosion. This phenomenon 
is sometimes observed when an extreme flood oc-
curs during construction of CFRD (concrete faced 
rockfill dams), before the concrete slab placing. It 
was the cause of the failure of Hell Hole dam 
(1964). It occurred on the 4th February 2014 at 
Tokwe-Mukorsi dam (Fig. 28).  
 
 
 
Figure 28. Backward erosion during the construction 
of the Mokwe Mukorsi CFRD dam 
 
To protect this type of shoulders from backward 
erosion, the smallest blocks and more graded curve 
with low permeability and high density are placed in 
the dam center and the largest rip-rap blocks are 
placed on the downstream face. The slope has to be 
designed using the Kovacs (1981) relationship and 
the refined Solvik equation (3) by EBL Kompetanze 
(2003) or the Knauss equation (1975) or Martins re-
lationship (1982). 
 
The three last equations give close dimensioning of 
the block diameters versus the slope and the unit 
discharge flows (Fig. 29). 
                      
                (3) 
 
With D50 the mean diameter of downstream blocks 
in m S the slope (V/H) and q the unit discharge flow 
in m3/s/m.  
 
 
Figure 28. Dimensioning of D50 versus unit discharge flow by, 
Knauss (1979) Martin (1982) and Solvik (2005) 
 
The fair drainage capacity shoulders have to be 
protected from sliding and hydraulic fracture. The 
criterion of effective normal stress equals to zero can 
be used (equation 2). From this point of view, thick 
cores (H/V=1/1) lead to less safe downstream shoul-
ders than thin cores (a larger core implies a thinner 
shoulder but a similar maximum water head at the 
end of the pipe).   
 
1
.
.1)tan( −





≤
Ww h
h
F γ
γβ  (2) 
 
For instance, applying this criterion using equation 
(2), (with the notations given with equation 1 above, 
and F meaning Factor of Safety) to the downstream 
toe of the core of Teton dam, shown on Figure 5, 
concludes that the shoulder cannot withstand the 
pressure. At Teton with hw=36 m and h=18 m, 
γ/γw=2 and F=1, tan(β) <0,33 meanings that the D/S 
slope should be H/V>3 when it was H/V=2,5 at ele-
vations higher than 1585 m. Conversely, applying 
the same criterion to the near failure of Fontenelle 
concludes that the shoulder could withstand the 
pressure. However, if the reservoir had not been 
dropped, backward erosion would have eroded the 
core. This means that another condition has to be 
explored: the hydraulic condition and the kinetics of 
the erosion rate. More work to integrate this condi-
tion is needed and will be published in due course. 
4 CONCLUSION 
Assessment of case histories of dam failures give  
crucial lessons for practitioners. Embankments 
without filters are at risk of failure by internal ero-
sion. No failure of large dam with a good filter at the 
good location is reported. However, design of a 
good filter is not enough, the watertightness of the 
dam body and of the foundation is the second safety 
barrier required. In most of the dams, the failure ini-
tiated with concentrated leak passing through de-
fects. And in most of the cases, the defects are open-
ings along adjoining structures and cracks through 
78,043,0
50 ..6,0 qSD =
cohesive soils or geologically continuous voids in 
foundations (open faults, open cracks, karsts). Only 
three failures of large dams initiated by internal ero-
sion through the dam body occurred on dams built 
after 1900 and operated at least 10 years. Two of 
them presented signs of internal erosion during op-
eration, no information was found on the third 
breached dam. Careful surveillance should be able to 
capture such signs and intervention should be able to 
stop internal erosion on the other dams in operation. 
The most susceptible soils to internal erosion are re-
sidual soils and volcanic soils. The most susceptible 
rocks are limestone and volcanic rocks. 
 Large scale physical models give other lessons on 
contact erosion, suffusion and backward erosion. No 
scale effect was noticed on the critical Darcy flow 
velocity. However fines transport can plug thin 
gravel layer and increase the critical value of the hy-
draulic gradient. Darcy flow velocity in gravel high-
er than the critical value could lead to concentrated 
leak at the base of the core. Thanks to thick  alluvi-
um shoulders, the concentrated leak could not lead 
to failure by piping. There is a critical value of the 
height of the shoulder on large silty cores with semi 
pervious or unstable gravel in the shoulders for pre-
venting the zoned dams or levees from the hydraulic 
fracture and failure. For very pervious gravelly 
shoulder (rockfill) the revised backward erosion cri-
terion of Solvik could be used. 
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